NEW DELHI: BRICS has entered its third decade at a moment when the foundations of the global economic order are under extraordinary pressure. What began in 2006 as a four-country grouping of Brazil, Russia, India and China has evolved into a far broader coalition of emerging economies and partner countries, representing an increasingly significant share of the world’s population, economic output and trade. But the real significance of BRICS at 20 is no longer its expansion or its combined economic statistics. The deeper story is the bloc’s growing determination to convert its economic weight into institutional influence. At the BRICS Business Forum in New Delhi, Prime Minister Narendra Modi presented a vision that went beyond conventional trade promotion, linking economic integration with technology, innovation, entrepreneurship, financial connectivity, maritime security and strategic resilience. At almost the same time, BRICS finance ministers and central bank governors intensified the call for reform of institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, demanding that emerging-market and developing economies receive a voice more proportionate to their contribution to the global economy. Taken together, these developments reveal a BRICS increasingly willing to challenge the imbalance between where global economic power now resides and where the rules governing that power are still written.
The numbers explain why this argument is gaining momentum. Modi pointed out that BRICS has expanded into a 21-country family and now accounts for roughly half of the world’s population, around 40% of global GDP and more than a quarter of global trade. He also highlighted the extraordinary growth of BRICS economies over the past two decades, which he said have expanded around 4.5 times compared with approximately 2.5 times for the global economy. Those figures are more than statistical markers; they form the political foundation of the bloc’s demand for a different international economic architecture. The institutions created in the aftermath of the Second World War were designed for a very different distribution of economic power. The global economy of 2026 is no longer the world of Bretton Woods. Asia, the Middle East, Africa and other emerging regions now occupy a much greater position in global production, trade, energy, investment and consumption, yet institutional influence has not always kept pace with that transformation. The BRICS argument is therefore becoming increasingly difficult to dismiss as simply political rhetoric: if emerging economies are responsible for an increasingly large share of global growth, why should their influence over the institutions that govern global finance remain comparatively constrained?
This is the central political economy question now confronting the IMF and World Bank. BRICS finance chiefs have called for international financial institutions to become more representative, transparent and accountable, arguing that the growing contribution of emerging and developing economies to global output and growth should be reflected in global economic governance. But beneath the diplomatic language is a much harder geopolitical argument. Financial institutions are not neutral structures operating outside the balance of power. Their lending mechanisms, voting arrangements, conditionalities, crisis responses and governance structures have consequences for national economic policy and, ultimately, geopolitical autonomy. For many countries across the Global South, the question is no longer simply how much development finance is available, but who determines the conditions under which that finance is provided. The BRICS push for reform is therefore part of a larger effort to ensure that emerging economies are not permanently treated as rule-takers in a system they increasingly help sustain.
Yet New Delhi’s approach is significant precisely because India is not presenting BRICS as a revolutionary project aimed at destroying the existing international economic system. Modi’s message is more pragmatic and, in some respects, more strategically sophisticated. India’s presidency is built around the principles of Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability, and its emphasis is on building practical economic mechanisms capable of giving BRICS members greater capacity to trade, invest, innovate and withstand external shocks. India wants BRICS to become a platform through which businesses can find new markets, startups can internationalise, technology can move across borders, supply chains can become more resilient and development cooperation can become more effective. This is an important distinction. Rather than promising an overnight replacement of the dollar, the IMF or Western financial institutions, New Delhi is focusing on creating additional options. In geopolitics, alternatives often matter more than declarations. A country does not necessarily need to abandon the existing system if it has enough alternative channels to reduce its vulnerability to pressure within that system.
That logic is particularly visible in BRICS’ growing attention to cross-border payments and local currencies. Finance ministers and central bank governors have encouraged continued work on interoperability among payment systems, seeking faster, cheaper, safer and more efficient mechanisms for cross-border transactions. For India, this is an area where its domestic technological experience gives it considerable diplomatic and commercial credibility. Modi highlighted the global scale of UPI-powered real-time payments, while India’s broader objective is to demonstrate that digital financial infrastructure can become an instrument of international economic connectivity. The strategic importance of this debate extends far beyond convenience. Global finance has historically depended heavily on a relatively concentrated network of currencies, banks, payment systems and financial institutions. As geopolitical competition intensifies and sanctions, tariffs, export controls and financial restrictions become increasingly common instruments of statecraft, emerging economies have greater incentives to diversify their financial channels. The BRICS objective is therefore not necessarily to eliminate the dollar but to reduce the consequences of excessive dependence on any single financial architecture.
That is where the debate over de-dollarisation must be understood with greater precision. Much of the public discussion treats de-dollarisation as if BRICS is preparing to unveil a single currency capable of replacing the US dollar. The reality is considerably more complex. The more immediate transformation is likely to occur through incremental changes: greater use of local currencies in bilateral trade, stronger national payment systems, interoperable digital platforms, alternative settlement mechanisms and expanded development finance through institutions such as the New Development Bank. If these mechanisms become sufficiently efficient, the cumulative effect could be significant even without a formal BRICS currency. The challenge, however, is formidable. BRICS members have different monetary policies, currencies, regulatory systems, financial markets and geopolitical priorities. China and India do not share identical strategic interests; Russia’s financial environment has been fundamentally altered by Western sanctions; Gulf economies remain deeply connected to global dollar-based markets; and countries such as Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa have their own monetary and trade priorities. BRICS therefore does not need complete financial uniformity to make progress, but it does need interoperability, trust and institutional reliability.
The same principle applies to trade. Modi’s call to remove the top 10 trade barriers among BRICS countries may appear technical, but it could become one of the most consequential elements of India’s presidency if implemented seriously. The greatest obstacle to deeper intra-BRICS trade may not necessarily be external pressure from Washington or Brussels; it may be the fragmentation within BRICS itself. Different customs procedures, regulatory standards, market-access rules, tariffs, certification requirements and investment regimes can make commerce between member countries unnecessarily complicated. A grouping that represents such a large share of global economic activity should theoretically possess enormous internal market potential, but political alignment does not automatically produce economic integration. Modi’s proposal to systematically identify and reduce the most significant trade barriers is therefore an attempt to address one of BRICS’ structural weaknesses: its extraordinary scale has not yet been matched by an equally integrated economic system.
India is also attempting to put entrepreneurship at the centre of this transformation. Modi highlighted India’s more than 200,000 startups and over 120 unicorns and argued that BRICS cooperation should help innovations reach international markets. His proposal to facilitate the expansion of 100 BRICS startups into other member markets every year is particularly significant because it shifts the focus from state-to-state economic diplomacy toward business-to-business integration. If successful, such a mechanism could gradually create a network of technology companies, investors, manufacturers and service providers operating across BRICS economies. The target of creating 1,000 new business partnerships across the grouping similarly reflects an effort to move BRICS away from summit diplomacy and toward measurable commercial outcomes. The real test of India’s presidency may ultimately be whether these initiatives produce companies, contracts, investments and supply-chain relationships that continue functioning after the summit banners come down.
Technology is central to that ambition. Semiconductors, quantum technology, biotechnology, critical minerals and shipbuilding are no longer merely sectors of economic opportunity; they are increasingly the foundations of national power. The semiconductor contest has demonstrated how technology supply chains can become geopolitical instruments. Critical minerals are central to electric vehicles, renewable energy, advanced electronics and defence technologies. Quantum technologies could reshape communications and computing, while biotechnology increasingly intersects with health security, agriculture and industrial competitiveness. Shipbuilding, meanwhile, connects industrial capacity with maritime power and global trade. By placing these sectors at the centre of the BRICS economic conversation, India is effectively arguing that the next phase of globalisation will be determined not simply by who sells the most goods, but by who controls the technologies, resources, infrastructure and supply chains that make those goods possible.
This is also why Modi’s emphasis on maritime security cannot be separated from his economic agenda. His warning that global trade can progress only when sea lanes are secure, supply routes remain open, freedom of navigation is protected and seafarers are safe reflects a reality increasingly visible across the global economy: geography remains brutally relevant in the age of digitalisation. A disruption in a major maritime corridor can rapidly increase shipping costs, delay energy supplies, disrupt manufacturing and accelerate inflation. For India, whose economic growth depends heavily on maritime commerce and imported energy, the security of sea lanes is a strategic economic issue. The same applies to other BRICS members whose economies depend on uninterrupted access to global shipping routes. Maritime security, therefore, is not an auxiliary issue for BRICS. It is part of the infrastructure of economic sovereignty.
The geopolitical backdrop makes the argument even more urgent. The current conflict involving Iran and the wider Middle East has demonstrated how quickly military confrontation can spill into energy markets, shipping routes, insurance costs, trade flows and inflation. India finds itself in a particularly delicate position. New Delhi maintains historical and strategic relations with Iran, deep ties with the Gulf, a strong strategic partnership with Israel and an expanding relationship with the United States. At the same time, Russia remains a major strategic and economic partner, while China remains both an economic competitor and an indispensable component of any serious Asian geopolitical calculation. India’s BRICS diplomacy is therefore not about choosing one camp against another. It is about creating strategic space in a world where the boundaries between economics, security and geopolitics have increasingly disappeared.
Iran’s participation in the BRICS debate reinforces this reality. Tehran has become one of the clearest examples of how financial restrictions, sanctions, energy politics and geopolitical confrontation can collide. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s call for an environment in which legitimate trade cannot be disrupted by external pressure reflects one of the core concerns motivating the wider BRICS financial agenda. Russia has similar incentives from a different geopolitical position, while other emerging economies are watching the evolution of sanctions and tariff policy with concern because they recognise that economic instruments can increasingly be deployed for strategic purposes. The BRICS response is not necessarily a rejection of international trade or globalisation; rather, it is an attempt to make globalisation less vulnerable to unilateral political decisions.
That argument becomes particularly important amid growing dissatisfaction with tariffs and non-tariff barriers. BRICS finance chiefs have criticised unilateral trade and financial measures that they argue distort commerce and undermine the principles of the multilateral trading system. The criticism comes at a time when major economies are increasingly using tariffs as instruments of industrial policy, national security and geopolitical leverage. For emerging economies, this creates an uncomfortable dilemma. They need access to major consumer markets, capital and technology, but they also want to avoid becoming collateral damage in strategic competition between larger powers. BRICS therefore offers them a platform to collectively argue for a trading system in which market access is not constantly subordinated to geopolitical pressure.
Women in business and entrepreneurship have also been incorporated into India’s broader economic agenda, with nearly 200 women business leaders participating in the BRICS Women’s Business Alliance meeting in India. While such initiatives may appear secondary beside the larger debates over IMF reform, currencies and trade, they reflect an important recognition that economic integration cannot be built solely through governments and large corporations. The expansion of business networks, entrepreneurship and women-led enterprises can create a wider constituency for intra-BRICS commerce and investment.
Ultimately, however, BRICS will be judged not by the scale of its declarations but by the credibility of its implementation. Its economic weight is undeniable, but economic weight alone does not automatically translate into geopolitical power. To become a genuine force in global economic governance, BRICS needs institutions that work, payment systems that function across borders, trade routes that remain open, development finance that delivers projects, technology partnerships that generate commercial value and businesses that actually operate across member markets. The three targets articulated by Modi — removing the top 10 trade barriers, helping 100 BRICS startups expand into other BRICS markets each year and creating 1,000 new business partnerships — provide precisely the kind of measurable benchmarks that can distinguish institutional transformation from summit rhetoric.
The larger battle, therefore, is not simply BRICS versus the West. That framing is too simplistic and fails to capture the complexity of the emerging world. The deeper contest is between an international system whose institutions were largely designed for the geopolitical realities of the 20th century and a global economy whose centre of gravity has shifted dramatically toward emerging powers. BRICS is attempting to exploit that gap. It is demanding greater representation in existing institutions while simultaneously building new mechanisms in trade, development finance, digital payments, technology and investment. India, through Modi’s presidency, is attempting to give that ambition a practical economic agenda rather than allowing BRICS to become merely another forum for geopolitical speeches.
At 20, BRICS is therefore approaching a decisive moment. Its first two decades were about proving that emerging economies could organise themselves and speak collectively. The next decade will be about whether that collective voice can become institutional power. The reform of the IMF and World Bank represents one front in that struggle. Local-currency trade and cross-border payment interoperability represent another. Technology, critical minerals, startups, infrastructure, maritime security and supply-chain resilience represent others. These are not isolated policy areas. Together, they form the emerging architecture of economic sovereignty in a fragmented world.
The most consequential question emerging from New Delhi is consequently not whether BRICS can replace the existing global financial system overnight. It cannot, and it does not need to. The more important question is whether BRICS can build enough economic connectivity and institutional capacity to ensure that emerging powers have genuine alternatives when the global system comes under geopolitical stress. If it succeeds, the consequences will extend far beyond BRICS itself. The IMF, World Bank, dollar-centred financial system, global trade architecture and Western-led institutions would increasingly face a more organised and economically confident Global South demanding a larger role in writing the rules.
BRICS is no longer simply asking for a bigger seat at the table. It is increasingly asking whether the architecture of the table itself reflects the world that exists today. At 20, the answer from New Delhi appears increasingly clear: the Global South wants not merely to participate in the global order, but to help design its next one.
-Dr. M Shahid Siddiqui
