TIANJIN, China: India and China are starting again in Tianjin, with the past weighing them down and the future full of possibilities. The meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit on August 31, 2025, was more than another diplomatic formality. It was an acknowledgment that despite decades of mistrust and rivalry, Asia’s two largest powers cannot afford to define their relationship only through conflict.
The language of “mutual trust, respect, and sensitivity” may sound familiar, but in Tianjin it carried a renewed urgency. Both leaders seemed aware that Asia’s path in the 21st century will depend, in part, on how carefully they manage their competition. For a world already shaped by shifting power balances and sharpening multipolarity, this meeting was both a cautious reset and a reminder of how fragile India–China relations remain.
The Weight of History
Every India–China summit carries the shadow of history. The border war of 1962 created wounds that never fully healed. For India, that conflict was a shattering reminder of misplaced trust; for China, it was an assertion of strength during its own turbulent rise. In the decades that followed, both countries sought to stabilize ties while leaving the boundary dispute unresolved.
But moments of confrontation, the Doklam standoff in 2017 and the deadly Galwan clash in 2020, brought that strategy to its breaking point. For New Delhi, Galwan was more than a military skirmish; it was a profound breach of faith. Modi’s insistence in Tianjin that peace along the border is the foundation of the entire relationship was deliberate. The point could not be clearer: economic engagement, political dialogue, and cultural exchange mean little if soldiers remain face-to-face on a fragile frontier.
Xi, too, appeared to acknowledge this reality, highlighting last year’s disengagement as an “opportunity to focus on the bigger picture.” Both sides pledged once again to work toward a fair and acceptable settlement of the boundary question. The words are not new, but the context is stark: after years of crisis, disengagement is no longer a choice but a necessity.
Trade: The Link That Refuses to Break
If borders divide, trade ties bind – albeit unequally. China has long been India’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade exceeding $135 billion in 2022–23. Yet this relationship remains structurally skewed, with India importing far more than it exports, leaving an $80 billion deficit that policymakers in Delhi describe as unsustainable.
After Galwan, India sought to push back banning Chinese apps, tightening investment rules, and promoting self-reliance through the Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative. Yet trade volumes grew, proof that decoupling is easier declared than achieved.
At Tianjin, Modi argued for “fairness and balance” in trade, while Xi countered that the two economies were “natural partners.” For both, the challenge is not just bilateral: it is about positioning within global supply chains already reshaped by U.S.–China rivalry. Here lies a paradox, while mistrust defines their politics, economic interdependence quietly pulls them closer.
Borders, Balance, and the Third Country Factor
The Tianjin reset also made clear that the old formula of “separating the border issue from other areas of cooperation” no longer works. India has tied progress on trade and political dialogue to peace on the Line of Actual Control. For China, keeping the border tense risks pushing India deeper into the U.S. orbit, something Beijing cannot afford amid its own strategic pressures.
This is why Modi’s statement that “India and China must not see their relationship through the lens of a third country” was telling. It was a reaffirmation of strategic autonomy: that India may deepen ties with the U.S., Japan, and Australia through the Quad, but it will not let its choices be dictated by Washington. Xi, for his part, stressed China’s respect for India’s independent path. This convergence of tone does not erase differences, but it signals a shared desire to prevent external powers from defining their engagement.
Multilateral Arenas: From SCO to BRICS
Tianjin also highlighted the importance of multilateral platforms in shaping India–China relations. Modi endorsed China’s SCO presidency and invited Xi to India’s BRICS summit in 2026. Xi, in turn, offered support, noting that cooperation in such forums strengthens the collective voice of the Global South.
For both countries, these platforms serve dual purposes. They provide a controlled environment for dialogue, away from Western scrutiny, and they reaffirm their status as representatives of emerging economies. The contrast is telling: while India’s G20 presidency in 2023 saw limited Chinese enthusiasm, SCO and BRICS offer spaces where the two countries can collaborate without the baggage of Western rivalry.
People-to-People Bridges
Beyond strategy and trade, the leaders also spoke of softer measures: restarting the Kailash Manasarovar Yatra, exploring direct flights, easing visas. Modi described these as “bridges of trust,” while Xi called them “symbols of civilizational friendship.” The gestures are small but significant, an attempt to soften nationalist mistrust and remind both societies that their ties are not defined solely by soldiers and statistics.
Beyond Leadership Diplomacy
A quieter but meaningful signal came from Modi’s meeting with Cai Qi, a senior member of China’s Politburo Standing Committee and a close aide to Xi. This showed Delhi’s willingness to look beyond summit optics and engage with the Communist Party leadership directly. Institutionalizing dialogue at this level may prove essential to avoiding the stop-start cycle that has long plagued the relationship.
Between Cooperation and Competition
The reality is that India and China are both rivals and partners. Beijing views India’s outreach in the Indo-Pacific as part of a U.S.-led containment strategy, while Delhi sees the Belt and Road Initiative as an intrusion into its neighborhood. Naval competition in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea only adds to tensions.
And yet, neither side can afford prolonged hostility. For India, confrontation drains resources from development. For China, worsening ties with Delhi deepen its isolation at a time of economic slowdown and heightened U.S. rivalry. Cooperation, however limited, is thus not an act of goodwill but one of necessity.
The Test Ahead
Tianjin should not be mistaken for a breakthrough. It is, at best, a reset – a pause that gives both sides space to reflect and recalibrate. The rhetoric of “trust, respect, and sensitivity” is valuable, but its worth will only be proven if it translates into action. That means maintaining peace on the border, narrowing the trade imbalance, building institutional channels beyond summitry, and shielding bilateral ties from external shocks.
The last two decades offer a cautionary tale. From the optimism of Wuhan in 2018 and Mamallapuram in 2019 to the bitterness of Galwan in 2020, India and China have repeatedly seen dialogue collapse under the weight of distrust. Tianjin is another chance, perhaps not the last, but certainly a crucial one.
For now, the message is clear: India and China will not be outright enemies, but nor will they find easy partnership. Their challenge is to compete without confrontation, to cooperate without illusion. And in that balancing act lies not only the future of two nations, but also the shape of multipolar Asia itself.
– Dr. Shahid Siddiqui; follow via X @shahidsiddiqui
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